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ABSTRACT 
 
As in many other developing countries, the concerns about food security in 
Indonesia during the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in policies aimed at achieving self-
sufficiency in food crops. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) combined price 
interventions and economic incentives to encourage agricultural production, especially of 
the staple crops.  From 1985 to 1998, Indonesia started a series of domestic and trade 
reforms emanating from a combination of unilateral undertakings, the country’s 
commitments to the WTO, and the government’s agreement with the IMF following the 
1997/98 financial crisis.  
This study computes nominal protection rates and producer support estimates 
(NPR and PSE) for Indonesia for the period 1985-2003 for six agricultural commodities, 
rice, maize, sugar, soybeans, crude palm oil, and natural rubber (representing more than 
two-thirds of Indonesian agricultural output) in an attempt to quantify the net effects of 
these policies. The NPRs and PSEs computed for Indonesia show that in spite of the 
reforms, the GOI has protected its agriculture over the past twenty years, although not 
uniformly across commodities. Although the reforms went a long way in reducing trade 
and domestic regulations on agricultural products, the study results demonstrate a return 
to protection for some commodities in recent years.   
The results presented in this study must be interpreted with the usual caution 
associated with the estimation of support indicators in general and the PSEs in particular 
due to the assumptions and judgments made when computing their various components. 
In the study, the choice of transportation costs and marketing margins may have 
underestimated the value of these activities, inflating or deflating (depending on the cost) 
the value of support accruing to producers. The choice of markets to compare 
international and domestic prices, in spite of the attention given to the differences in 
processing and accounting for marketing costs, may raise the issue of whom is actually 
benefiting from the support, the farmer, the miller, or the trader. The process of  “scaling-  iii
up” the PSE values to all of agriculture without examining the policies affecting the non-
covered commodities underscore the necessity for a more comprehensive study, which 
would include other agricultural sectors, for example the livestock sector. Nevertheless, a 
reasonable assessment of support for agriculture in Indonesia over the period 1985-2003 
emerges from the analysis presented. 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN INDONESIA: 
PRODUCER SUPPORT ESTIMATES 1985-2003 
 
 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Both developed and developing countries use a wide variety of domestic and trade 
measures aimed at agriculture. Studies have shown that developed countries tend to 
protect their agriculture (OECD, 2003), while policies followed by developing economies 
have historically resulted in a bias against agriculture (Schiff and Valdés, 1992). Either 
way, policy interventions can have a distorting effect on agriculture and trade. Since 
1987, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
adopted and refined measures of annual domestic support to agriculture for its member 
countries.
2  Although the OECD has started to include some non-member countries (such 
as transition economies) in its monitoring and evaluation exercises, currently no 
comparable systematic set of measures of agricultural policies exist for developing 
countries.  
Assessing the nature and level of agriculture support (or taxation) will clarify the 
role of agriculture domestic policies and border trade policies in developing countries. 
Many developing countries have undergone a series of economic policy reforms, 
sometimes unilaterally, often under the World Bank or International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) structural adjustment programs, but also in accordance with commitments as 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This has gone a long way in reducing 
the bias against agriculture but many developing countries still use complex and obscure 
trade and domestic policies motivated by conflicting political and economic goals.  The 
                                                 
1 Research Analyst and Senior Research Fellow, respectively, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2033 K Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006: E-mail: 
m.b.Thomas@cgiar.org and d.orden@cgiar.org. 
2 For details on how the concept and these measures developed, see Josling and Tangermann (1989).    2
net effect can be either to protect or disprotect the production of various agricultural 
commodities. 
This study is part of a project to compute producer support estimates (PSEs) in 
agriculture for selected Asian developing countries, using a common methodology 
drawing on the one developed by the OECD, as well as variant definitions and 
applications (Mullen et al., 2004).
3  
Nominal protection rates and producer support estimates (NPR and PSE) are 
evaluated for Indonesia, which after 30 years of relative stability and strong economic 
growth is facing the challenges of recovery after a major financial crisis in 1997/98 
(Barichello, 2000; Temple, 2003).  Figure 1.1 illustrates the almost uninterrupted growth 
that the country experienced between 1968 and 1997 (a growth rate above 7 percent on 
average). Evidence of Indonesia’s success has been reviewed by an abundant literature, 
which has been unanimous in crediting the former president Suharto’s economic policies: 
stable macroeconomic policies, strong public investment favorable to agriculture, and 
successful management of oil boom windfalls to fund agriculture development (Hill, 
2000; Temple, 2003; ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/CRESCENT, 2004). The agriculture GDP 
growth rate has been slower and more volatile during this period (Figure 1.1). The 
1997/98 financial crisis resulted in a drop in GDP but the non-agriculture sector was 
much more affected than agriculture because of the nature of the crisis 
(ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/CRESCENT, 2004). 
In agriculture, achieving self-sufficiency in food crops remains the government’s 
main approach to assuring food security, but it increasingly conflicts and competes for 
resources with other government goals, such as poverty alleviations, decentralization and 
diversification of the agricultural sector toward higher value crops 
(BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI, 2001).  
                                                 
3 Among recent studies on variants of PSEs for developing economies are Valdés (1996) for eight Latin 
American countries, Pursell and Gupta (1998) and Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for India, and Valdés 
(2000) for five transition economies.   3
In the domestic context, the government is phasing out the role of its largest state-
owned agency, Indonesia’s Food Logistics Agency, BULOG, while devising new 
programs to promote the production of food crops.
4 While in 2000, the Government of 
Indonesia (GOI) reverted to border measures to protect selected commodities such as rice 
and sugar, it is committed to trade liberalization in the context of the IMF induced 
reforms, and its membership in the WTO (IMF, 1998; WTO, 2003b).  
The computation of indicators of support is a first step in measuring the 
quantitative effects of changes in government policies as they pertain to agriculture in 
general or to selected commodities specifically. Support indicators are also intended to 
provide a framework to identify and classify the government policies they measure. The 
study for Indonesia covers the period 1985-2003 and NPRs and PSEs are computed for 
six agricultural commodities, rice, maize, sugar, soybeans, crude palm oil, and natural 
rubber. These six commodities account for more than two-thirds of Indonesia’s 
agricultural output during the period.  
Figure 1.1—Growth in nominal GDP, Indonesia (1965-2001) 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI (2003). 
                                                 
4 One such program was Gema Palagung (1997/98), a self-reliance program aimed at developing the 
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2.  BACKGROUND AND AGRICULTURAL OVERVIEW 
 
For nearly 30 years, under the “New Order” regime of Suharto, Indonesia 
experienced a transformation in performance (Figure 1.1; Temple, 2003). The economy 
grew, benefiting from two oil booms as well as from policies aimed at stabilizing the 
macroeconomic environment and developing the agricultural sector.  Although growing 
corruption and mismanagement of financial institutions led the economy into trouble, the 
macro component of the economy was thought to be the best among developing 
economies (Barichello, 2000; Hill, 2000; Temple, 2003).  Suharto focused on economic 
development and the GOI undertook major reforms, outlined in detail in a series of five-
year plans (“Repelita I to VI) starting in 1969/70 (Indonesia, 1995). From the late 1960s 
to 1997, in agriculture Indonesia made significant progress in increasing domestic food 
production, stabilizing food prices, reducing poverty and increasing food security.
5 The 
government also invested in broad based rural development including infrastructure, 
health, and education (BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI, 1999;  Magiera, 2003). 
In the period from 1965 until the crisis in 1997/98, GDP per capita rose more than 
fourfold and life expectancy went from 43 to 68 years, dropping slightly after the crisis to 
66 years. The incidence of poverty declined and progress was made raising the adult 
literacy rate of the population from 60 percent in 1970 to 85 percent in 1997 and 89.3 in 
2001 (Table 2.1). Another aspect in the country’s development is the decrease in the 
share of employment in agriculture from 75 percent to below 50 percent and the increase 
in the share of the population living in urban areas from 16 to 44 percent (Temple, 2003; 
WTO, 2003b). In 2002, Indonesia ranked 111
th out of 177 countries in human 
development, having improved consistently its overall index from 0.582 in 1985 to 0.692 
in 2002 (UNDP, 2004). In spite of its performance, Indonesia is a low-income country 
with a GDP per capita of US$ 678 in 2001 (just above half of its 1997 level of US$ 
1,110). It has been classified also as a low-income food-deficit country (LIFDC).   
                                                 
5 The “Third Plan,”  which covered the period 1979/80 to 1984/85, was called the Trilogy of Development 
because it included three government’s objectives: the equitable distribution of development gains, 
economic growth, and the maintenance of political and economic stability (Indonesia, 1995).   5
The 1997/98 Asian crisis led the country into a deep recession evidenced by a 
GDP drop of  –13 percent, an inflation rate of more than 77 percent, and an increase in 
the unemployment rate to 17 percent (WTO, 2003b). The Rupiah depreciated by nearly 
52 percent. The economy started to recover in 2000 at an average rate of 4 percent (2000-
2001, Figure 1.1) but with an unemployment rate of 8 percent.
6 The poverty level 
measured by the share of the population below the poverty line grew to 27 percent in 
1999 from 15 percent in 1996 (Table 2.1). Trade also suffered from the crisis, and in 
1998 merchandise export and imports declined by 10.5 and 31 percent, respectively. 
Finally, the country experienced also a political crisis, which forced Suharto to step down 
and general elections to be held in 1999.
7   
Manufactured products and fuels, which together account for 80 percent of 
merchandise trade, continue to dominate Indonesian trade (Table 2.1). Indonesia’s main 
trading partners are Japan, the EU, the United States, and Singapore (WTO, 2003b). It is 
also a member of the Cairns group and the G-20 within the WTO.
8 
As for many developing countries, agriculture is a major sector in the Indonesian 
economy. It represents 17 percent of GDP, employs 45 percent of the labor force, and is 
home to 57 percent of the poor (FAO, 2002). Agriculture trade accounts for 12 percent of 
exports and 17 percent of imports (Table 2.1).  
Indonesia is the world largest producer of coconuts, second largest producer of 
copra, palm kernels, palm oil, and natural rubber, and the third largest producer of rice 
                                                 
6 The official figure does not account for underemployment. 
7 Suharto’s authoritarian regime lasted from 1965 to 1998. Before his seventh consecutive five-year term in 
office, and following the mid-1997 financial crisis, he stepped down. The Presidential election in October 
1999 brought Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency and Megawati Soekarnoputri was appointed 
president in a special session on July 23, 2001, ahead of the scheduled date of August 1, 2001 (Indonesia, 
2004).  
8 The eight developing country Cairns Group members (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, 
Paraguay, the Philippines and South Africa) are also members of the G-20. The G-20 emerged just prior 
to the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun (September 10-14, 2003) as a group of developing countries 
with shared concerns regarding the lack of developed countries’ willingness to reform their agriculture 
policies with regard to subsidies and market access. The G-20 group of countries includes 63 percent of 
the world’s farmers and accounts for 20 percent of world agricultural production, 26 percent of total 
world agricultural exports and 17 percent of total world agricultural imports (Jaura, 2003). 
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(EEAU, 2000). Production is concentrated in the islands of Java, Sumatera, and Sulawesi. 
Smallholder farms (average size of farm of one hectare) occupy the largest share of 
cultivated land (87 percent), and grow mostly food crops (90 percent of total rice and 
maize output). Large-scale farms, state or privately owned, account for a small share of 
agricultural output but the larger share of agricultural exports, such as rubber, palm-oil, 
coffee, and cocoa (EEAU, 2000). Agricultural GDP is still dominated by food crops (51.7 
percent) and rice dominates among these crops. Agriculture’s share of GDP has remained 
on average the same for more than a decade, with fisheries increasing in importance 
(Table 2.2). 
The 1997/1998 financial crisis resulted in a shortage of foreign exchange and the 
depreciation of the Rupiah affecting mostly the manufacturing sector and employment in 
urban areas. During the same period, Indonesia experienced the worst drought in 50 
years, following the El Niño weather system, putting additional pressure on agriculture, 
more specifically the production of food crops (EEAU, 2000). 
Table 2.1—Indonesia main economic and social indicators (2001 unless otherwise 
indicated) 
Land area (million km
2) 1.9
  Urban share of population (%, 2002)    44.5 
Population (million, 2002)  217.1  Nominal GDP at current market prices (US$ 
billions) 
 141.6 
Population growth (%, 1995-2001)  1.6  GDP per capita (US$)    678 
UN human development index (2002) 
  GDP per capita annual growth rate (%)    1.8 
- Overall  ranking  111









GDP shares (%): 
     Agriculture 
     Industry 






  Poverty indicators (share in percent of the  
      population under  the national  poverty line, %) 
  15.7  (1996) 
27.1 (1999) 
Life expectancy at birth (years, 2002)  66.6  Globalization indicator (2002)
1   59 
Infant mortality rate per '000   40.9       
Adult literacy (%, 2002)  87.9  Structure of trade   Exports  Imports 
Enrolment ratio (net) in education (%)  - primary    91.9 
- secondary 48.8 
 





         Agriculture  (%)     13  17 
         Manufactures (%)  56  61 
         Oil and gas (%)  25  18 
         Other (%)  6  4 
Source:  Adapted from WTO ( 2003b), and updated for later years from UNDP (2004), and WDI (2003).   
  Note:      
1 Foreign Policy (2004).   7
Table 2.2—Agriculture in the Indonesian economy (1991-95 and 1999-2002) 
 
Sectors      




   (million  US$) 
Agricultural GDP 
1 26,828  26,886 
      
   1991-1995 1999-2002 
Share of Agricultural GDP 
2 (in  percent) 
 Food  crops  55.8  51.7 
 Non-food  crops  16.6  15.6 
 Livestock  11.4  12.0 
  Forestry    6.9  6.4 
  Fisheries    9.3  14.3 
      
  
Production 
Share in the value of 
production 
      
Commodity Output (2000-2003 average) 
3 (millions  mt)  (percent) 
 Rice  (milled)  34.8  40.5 
 Maize  9.9  5.5 
 Soybeans  0.8  0.9 
 Sugar  (refined)  1.9  2.9 
  Palm Oil (CPO)  8.8  11.5 
 Natural  Rubber
4  1.6 3.9 
     Total    65.2 
 
Sources: 
1 Indonesia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, September 2003; 
2 1991-1995, Fuglie and Piggott (2003: 
Table 2); 1999-2002, Authors’ calculations based on data from Indonesia Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, September 2003; 
3 Authors’ calculations based on PSE estimates (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
for details); 
4 2000-2002 only for natural rubber. 
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3.  AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
 
The direction of Indonesia’s economic and development policies, often follows 
the significant exogenous shocks resulting from fluctuating international oil prices (Hill, 
2000).  After a period of significant growth attributed to the two oil price booms in the 
1970s (1971-74 and 1978-80), which benefited Indonesia as an oil exporter, the early 
1980s marked a decline in GDP growth, when oil prices declined.
9 The years that follow 
until the early 1990s marked a period of liberalization and recovery during which 
Indonesia developed its non-oil sectors (Hill, 2000).  
Bautista et al. (1997) refer to the mid-1980s as a “watershed” in economic 
policymaking in Indonesia. From 1985 to 1998, Indonesia started a series of domestic 
and trade reforms emanating from a combination of unilateral undertakings, the country’s 
commitments to the WTO, and the government’s agreement with the IMF following the 
financial crisis (APEC, 2002; Magiera, 2003).   
 
3.1  DOMESTIC POLICIES 
As in other developing countries, the concerns about food security during the 
1980s and early 1990s, resulted in policies aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food 
crops, especially rice. The GOI combined price interventions and economic incentives 
through subsidized inputs, substantial investment in irrigation, and rice marketing 
activities in the outer islands to encourage agricultural production, especially of the staple 
crops (Piggot et al., 1993; Bautista et al., 1997; WTO, 1998).  Until 1998, policies 
included intensification programs, “BIMAS”, for rice, field crops, and livestock 
(combination of subsidized inputs and guaranteed prices for output) and “nucleus estate” 
programs aimed at integrating smallholders into large plantation production (Fuglie, 
2001).
10  
                                                 
9 In the 1980s, crude oil and petroleum products contributed about two thirds of total exports, a fourth of 
GNP and 70 percent of government revenue (Bautista et al., 1997). 
10 These programs promoted high-yield varieties together with subsidized fertilizer, pesticides, and credit 
and offered technical assistance to farmers on the new cultivation techniques (Fuglie, 2001).   9
During the late 1980s and 1990s, one of the major domestic reforms affecting 
agriculture was the phasing out of input subsidies. The subsidies on pesticides were 
removed in 1989 (WTO, 1998). Fertilizers subsidies, by far the largest input subsidy, 
were eliminated in December 1998 (Barichello, 2003), but reinstated in 2003.   
Under conditions from the IMF, the GOI agreed to structural reforms, including 
restructuring or privatizing key state enterprises. By the summer of 1998, the government 
ended BULOG’s monopoly on trade and replaced its general consumer rice price 
stabilization through market interventions with a targeted rice  distribution program to 
poor households, called OPK Beras,  which in 1999 provided 20 kilograms of subsidized 
rice per household to 10 millions households (Daly and Fane, 2002).
11  
 
3.2  TRADE POLICY REGIME 
Agricultural trade in Indonesia has been heavily regulated by tariffs, import 
licensing, export taxes and bans, and informal export quotas. To encourage domestic 
processing industries, export taxes were levied on primary products, so as to provide 
inputs to the processing sector. Even processed agricultural products were subjected to 
import restrictions (Bautista et al., 1997). Some reforms were undertaken in the mid-1980 
which reduced the number of tariff rates, lowered the ceiling on tariff rates, and raised the 
number of import items with very low tariff rates. In spite of these reforms, products 
corresponding to 54 percent of domestic agricultural production remained on the 
“Restricted Goods List.” Import monopoly for most of these commodities was under the 
control of BULOG and other state trading companies (Bautista et al., 1997). Three 
categories of commodities were subject to export control: certain items were banned, 
controlled by the Department of Trade, or restricted to licensed exporters. The majority 
of these items originated in the agricultural sector and included rice, soybean flour and 
vegetable oils (Piggot et al., 1993). 
Although agriculture was mostly left out of the 1985 trade reforms, further trade 
reforms in 1991 reduced the share of agricultural products under import licensing 
                                                 
11 In 2002 the name was changed to RASKIN.   10
restriction to 30 percent. However rice, soybean and sugar continued to be regulated 
(Bautista et al., 1997).  Magiera (2003) assesses that the 1995 WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) was not very constraining on Indonesia trade policies because the 
country, unilaterally, had committed to a tariff reduction schedule (Pakmei schedule, 
1995-2003, Table 3.1), which upon completion would have reduced the average tariff on 
agriculture to 13.2 percent, far below the average agricultural bound tariff of 47.7 percent 
(Table 3.2; Magiera, 2003).  
The agreement with the IMF put pressure on Indonesia to reduce its tariffs on 
agriculture: all food tariffs were to be reduced to 5 percent and non-food agricultural 
tariffs to a maximum of 10 percent by 2003 (Magiera, 2003). On this basis, the average 
applied import tariff for agriculture was 8.3 percent in 2002 (Table 3.2).  By the end of 
1998, Indonesia also agreed to liberalize rice trade to private traders, removing BULOG’s 
monopoly (Wailes, 2003). But with the end of the IMF program (2003) the trend toward 
protectionist and other interventionist measures in agricultural trade have reemerged 
(Wailes, 2003; Ray, 2003). Import tariffs and special import licensing continue to affect 
rice,  and sugar.  
The 1990s trade reforms served also to relax export controls, which have been 
extensively used in Indonesia, especially affecting non-food products.  Under the 1998 
IMF agreement, Indonesia agreed to eliminate export restrictions but maintained its 
export taxes on palm oil, crude palm oil and their derivative products, wood, and rattan. 
Indonesia also continues to regulate certain commodity exports (manioc, coffee and its 
extracts, rubber, veneer and plywood, and teakwood) using a combination of voluntary 
export and supply management arrangements aimed at reducing world over-supply and 
the resulting depressed prices.  Voluntary export quotas of coffee terminated in 2002 
while those for rubber continued until mid 2002 (WTO, 2003b).  
Starting in 2002, Indonesia, along with the other five original ASEAN members 
(1967), implemented the final phase of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA, 
1992). Indonesia has reduced tariffs for all products included in its original commitment 
(7,206 tariff lines) to five percent or less for products of at least 65 percent ASEAN   11
origin. Despite the accelerated progress Indonesia maintains rice and sugar in the 
sensitive list, which are exempted from tariff reduction (Economic Intelligence Unit, 
2003; USTR, 2004). 
 
3.3  WTO AGRICULTURAL COMMITMENTS 
Market Access 
Indonesia notifies the WTO on tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for rice and milk and 
cream fats and products:  the rice TRQ is 70,000 mt with an in-quota tariff rate of 90 
percent; and the milk and cream TRQ is 414,700 mt with an in-quota tariff rate of 40 
percent. But since the implementation of the WTO AoA, Indonesia’s imports of these 
products have been in excess of the quota and applied tariff rates have been lower than 
bound in-quota rates.  TRQs for milk and cream have been abolished since 1998. The 
current tariff for these products is 5 percent with no quota. Import surcharges were 
eliminated in January 1996 (WTO, 2003b and 2003c). 
All agricultural tariff lines are subject to bound tariff rates and these rates are to 
decrease by 2004 (Table 3.3).  The average applied tariff rate has decreased between 
1998 and 2002, but more so for industrial products than for agricultural products (Table 
3.2). WTO (2003b) estimates the average applied tariff for agriculture (ISIC 
classification) to be 4 percent in 2002 down from 4.2 in 1998.
12 The large gap between 
Indonesia’s applied tariffs and its high bound tariffs offers the country considerable 
flexibility in negotiating for more open markets by other countries in exchange for 
reducing its tariffs bindings (Magiera, 2003). 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and food quality regulations have led to import 
restrictions, especially on animals and animal products and other food items requiring a 
halal certificate (Islamic purity on animals and products derived from animals).   
                                                 
12 The average applied tariff for agriculture gives different values depending on the classification used.   12
Domestic Support 
The GOI notifies the WTO only on support provided through various 
development programs under the green box measures, which are exempt from the 
reduction commitment (Table 3.4). Measures classified under “general services” 
constitute more than half of total expenditures on green box measures.     
Following the crisis, the second largest program, nearly a third of total support in 
2000, is domestic food aid (Table 3.4). Public stockholding for food security picked up in 
1998 and 1999, also during the crisis, but declined to pre-crisis levels in 2000. The 
measure includes buffer stocks to cover minimum requirements, and operational stocks 
for budget group allocation and price stabilization.
13  
The composition of general service expenditures changed in 2000. Total 
expenditures have decreased by 40 percent, mainly due to the elimination of expenditures 
on estate crops development programs.  Expenditures on agricultural research also 
declined by 40 percent, but expenditures on development programs for livestock and 
agribusiness have doubled and tripled, respectively (Figure 3.1). 
Although the GOI sets administered prices for both rice and sugar, it lacks the 
resources to support domestic prices at the administered level. Indonesia did not commit 
to an aggregate measure of support to agriculture (AMS), so the commodity-specific de 
minimis standard (10 percent of value of production for developing countries) applies to 
every product (Magiera, 2003). 
Export Subsidies 
Indonesia’s notification of export subsidies for rice allows the government to 
dispose of surplus stocks, but since the implementation of the WTO AoA, Indonesia has 
not subsidized rice exports (Magiera, 2003). 
 
                                                 
13 Budget group allocation is the distribution of rice to military personnel and civil servants.   13
Figure 3.1—General services expenditures (1995-2000) 
 





























































a. Agricultural Research and Development programmes  b. Agricultural Training and Extension programmes 
c. Livestock development programmes  d. Estate crops development programmes 
e. Agribusiness development programmes  f. Food crops and horticulture development programmes   14
Table 3.1—Indonesia pre- and post-crisis (1997/98) international trade and 
agriculture policies: commitments and reforms 
 
International trade commitments 
Tariffs 
(Pakmei schedule and 
IMF)
 
•  Import tariffs of <20% in 1995 reduced to a maximum of 5% in 2000. 
•  Import tariffs of >20% in 1995 reduced to a maximum of 20% in 1998 and to a 
maximum of 10% in 2003. 
Non-tariffs  Elimination of restrictions on import licenses: 
•  Dairy products switched from approved importers (IT) to general importer (IU). 
•  Cloves switched from the regulation of BPPC
1 to IU. 
•  The importation of sugar and rice is liberalized, previously imported only by 
producer importers.  
Anti-Dumping 
Measures 
To date Indonesia has investigated 20 cases, and imposed anti-dumping duties on 7 
non-agriculture products but none on agricultural products. 
WTO Special 
Safeguard Measures 
To date no special safeguard measures have been imposed. 
State trading-
enterprises 
 GOI notified the WTO that both BULOG and BPPC operate as state trading 
enterprises (STEs). 
Reforms following the 1997/98 financial crisis 
Trade   •  September 1998: BULOG import monopoly on rice, sugar, wheat and wheat 
flour was abolished. 
•  Soybeans: 
     1998, abolition of tariff. 
•  Rice: 
9  September 1998 to December 1999, import tariff was set at 0%. 
9  January 2000 to present, specific duty of Rp430/kg has been applied to imports 
(25-30% tariff equivalent). 
9  Import licenses (NPIK) given to private traders. 
9  In January 2004, ban on rice imports was imposed until June 2004, but was 
later extended. 
•  Palm oil 
In 1998, ban on exports of crude palm oil  (and its products) followed by export 
tax rates ranging from 40 to 60 percent. Export tax rate reduced to 10 percent by 
1999, and to 3 percent by 2003. 
•  Sugar: 
9  In 2000 import licensing is replaced by a 20 percent tariff for raw sugar and a 
25 percent tariff for refined sugar. 
9  In 2002 import ad-valerum tariffs are replaced by specific import duties of 
Rp.550/kg for raw sugar and Rp.700/kg for white sugar. 
•  Export quotas on coffee and rubber continue to be used. 
Domestic   •  Fertilizer subsidies are removed in December 1998, but reinstated in 2003. 
•  Rice 
9  Market price support for rice provided through BULOG: It sets the criteria and 
announces the rice procurement to the public. It buys paddy or rice from 
farmers or traders on a first come, first serve basis. 
9  From August 1998 to December 2001, the GOI replaced its general consumer 
rice price stabilization through market interventions with a targeted rice 
distribution program to poor households, called OPK Beras until a change in  
name to RASKIN in 2002. 
 
Sources: Casson (2000); WTO (2003a); Mageira (2003).  
Note:   
1State owned enterprise for Cloves.   15
 
Table 3.2—Tariff structure (1998 and 2002) 




   1998 2002  1998 
Total     9.5  7.2  37.6 
  Agricultural products (HS classification)
1  8.6 8.3  47.3 
  Industrial products (HS classification)  9.7  7.0  35.9 
  Textiles and clothing  14.6  10.5  29.3 
 
Source: WTO (2003b: Table III.1). 
Note: 
1 See footnote 10. 
 
 
Table 3.3—WTO bound tariff rates for selected agricultural commodities            
(1994 and 2004) 
 1994  2004 
 (%)  (%) 
Cloves 75  60 
Dairy products   50-238  40-210 
Soybean meal  45  40 
Garlic 60  40-50 
Wheat 30  27 
Wheat flour  30  27 
Rice   180  160 
Sugar 110  95 
Soybeans 30  27 
Alcoholic beverages  170  150 
 
Source: Magiera (2003: Table1). 
 
Table 3.4—Indonesia’s green box measures (1995-2000) 
Measures  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
    Rupiah  billion    
General  Services  366.1 407.4 557.2 622.3 825.9 503.6 
Public stockholding for food security  32.0  38.3  55.5  264.5  346.5  65.7 
Domestic Food Aid        411.0  425.6  305.5 
Payments for relief from natural  
    disasters  2.7  4.0  4.8 11.8 14.8 12.7 
Total    400.8 449.7 617.5  1309.6  1612.8 887.5 
         
Exchange  rate  (Rp/US$)  2239 2348 2953 9875 7809 8527 
Total  (US$  million)  179 192 209 133 207 104 
 
Source: WTO (2003b).   16
4.  NPR INDICATORS OF SUPPORT 
 
 
4.1  NPR RESULTS FROM SELECTED INDONESIA STUDIES 
Indonesia was not included in two major studies on indicators of support of 
agriculture for developing countries, the PSE study conducted by the USDA-ERS (1992) 
and the Kruger, Shift, Valdés (1988), which calculated direct and indirect nominal 
protection rates (NPRs).
14 Other studies have computed NPRs and other indicators for 
Indonesia and we review here two analyses (Table 4.1).
15 In the case of Indonesia we 
have not identified any previous published study that has fully computed PSEs. 
In a 1993 IFPRI study, Gonzales et al. investigate the economic incentives and 
competitiveness of food crops in Indonesia in an effort to suggest policies aimed at 
diversifying the country’s agriculture under changing domestic and international 
environments. The authors estimate direct and indirect NPRs, and effective protection 
rates (EPRs) for rice, maize, soybeans, sugar, and cassava for 1986 following the Kruger, 
Schiff, Valdés (1988) methodology.  They compute these indicators by regions, taking 
into account the costs of processing, marketing, transporting and distributing the crops. 
Three trade scenarios were considered: import substitution, export promotion, and within-
country interregional trade. The NPRs are also computed at two levels, the farm and 
wholesale levels. Following Kruger, Schiff, Valdés, they estimate the equilibrium 
exchange rate, and quantify the effect of the overvaluation of the rupiah in 1985/86. They 
found that the indirect effect is negative and not trivial (-16 percent) and at the national 
level overrides the modest direct protection for rice and maize. For sugar and soybeans, 
the high direct protection outweighs the negative indirect effects (Table 4.1). For cassava 
(not shown here), the only exportable, the negative indirect effect adds to direct negative 
protection. 
                                                 
14 Indonesia was included in and earlier USDA-ERS study (Ross, 1990). The study computed PSEs for rice   
from 1982-1987.  
15 Fane and Condon (1996) also computed real effective rates of protection (RERP) of 131 sectors for 1995, 
including 21 agricultural sectors and compared them to 1987 RERPs computed by Fane and Phillips 
(1991). They observed a fall in the rate in agriculture from 9 to 4 percent.   17
In a recent study, Richard Barichello (2003) examines the pattern of policies for 
selected food crops (rice, maize, sugar, and soybeans) and fertilizers from 1985 to 2000 
and its potential effects on water demand.  Barichello examines the budget structure of 
the GOI and computes nominal rates of protection. Although specific allocations of the 
budget expenditures to individual crops were not available, the author concludes that 
border measures have been the government’s dominant instrument in supporting 
agriculture. The relative dominance of border measures has increased, especially since 
1999 when the fertilizer subsidy, a major budgetary expense (Rps 650 billion on average 
from 1984 to1990 and Rps 357 billion on average from 1991/92 to 1998/99), was 
eliminated. Barichello observes that the level of support has been declining in general, 
except for rice and sugar, which continue to benefit from policy transfers relative to other 
commodities (Table 4.1). 
 
4.2  BASIC MODEL SET-UP AND DATA SOURCES 
 
This paper extends the above studies, data allowing, in several ways:  
 
•  By using transport and marketing margins as Gonzales et al. (1993) to adjust the 
international and producer observed prices, but extending the period of coverage 
from 3 years to 18 years.  
•  Extends the crop coverage in Barichello (2003) and includes estate crops in order 
to capture a larger share of agricultural production.  
•  Applies budgetary outlays to individual crops to estimate commodity specific 
transfers. 
•  Expands the time line to recent years (2001 to 2003) to capture effects of the 
policy reforms during additional post-crisis recovery years.  
NPRs are a first step to estimate the amount of price support, the market price 
support (MPS), for the selected commodities. The nominal protection of a commodity is 
one of the simplest indicator measures of the impact of government policy on output and   18
inputs. It expresses the divergence, due to government’s interventions, between the 
commodity’s domestic price  (also called producer, private or incentive price), which 
reflects current policies, and its border price (also called a social or reference price), 
which abstracts from these distortions. 
 
The NPR for a specific commodity is expressed in percentage terms: 
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where:
           : average producer price (in domestic currency)
           : reference price adjusted to equivalence with the producer price
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where:
           : world price adjusted for international freight (in $US)
              : official exchange rate (Rp/$US)
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Pp  must also be adjusted to reflect equivalent price at wholesale market. Thus: 
 
 
  (1 )
wholesale farmgate
pp PP M M =+   (4) 
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where:
            : marketing and processing margin from farmgate to wholesale market 
                    expressed as a rate of the farmgate price.
MM  
In the case of exports, the reference price is the country’s f.o.b price expressed in 
domestic currency less internal handling, transport and processing costs from port to 
wholesale market (TC). 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 describe the definitions and sources of the various components 
of the NPRs computed for Indonesia. Several issues of measurements are reviewed 
regarding the selection of reference prices, the level and nature of adjustments, and the 
regional variability. 
•  The trade status of each commodity is measured by the commodity net exports 
(exports less imports) for the period 1985-2003. The trade status is important 
when determining the appropriate reference price and price adjustments (see 
Equations 2 and 3). Indonesia’s trade status in rice and maize as a net importer 
has been consistent in the 1990s (except for 1993 for rice and 1998 for maize), but 
less so in the 1980s. Mullen et al. (2004) estimates MPS for wheat in India under 
import and export assumptions, to accommodate the fluctuations in trade patterns. 
A third alternative is also used by computing a market-clearing equilibrium price 
in lieu of an export or import adjusted reference price (Mullen et al., 2004).  
Considering that the trade fluctuations at the beginning of the period are small, the 
measurements for rice and maize for Indonesia assume that both commodities are 
importable and use the import hypothesis.  The other commodities have been 
consistently net imports in the case of sugar and soybeans or next exports in the 
case of palm oil and rubber.  
•  The reference price at the border can be the c.i.f. equivalent “world price” for 
imports (f.o.b. for exports) or alternatively the import unit value (or export unit 
value for exports). The advantage of selecting the import unit value as the 
reference price is to avoid having to estimate international freight to get to a c.i.f.   20
equivalent. But in some cases, the import unit value deviates from the more 
general world price, like in the case of rice, maize and sugar (Figures 4.1a-c). For 
these commodities, the “world price” is selected and adjusted by the international 
freight estimates (Table 4.2).  In the case of soybeans, the import unit value is 
judged to be a better reference price than the c.i.f. Rotterdam, although both series 
move in a similar trend (Figure 4.1d). In the case of exports (crude palm oil and 
natural rubber), the export unit value is used (Table 4.3).  
•  Gonzales et al. (1993)’s 1986 estimates for international and domestic transport 
costs, and marketing costs are extended to the period 1985-2003. International 
transport costs and domestic adjustments from port to wholesale are a fixed share 
of the world price. Domestic adjustments from farmgate to wholesale are a fixed 
share of the producer price.   
•  Rice quantities and prices are adjusted to convert the price and production of 
paddy rice (Gabah Kering) to milled rice equivalent (Table 4.2). In the case of 
sugar, the only available price data to estimate the NPRs are for refined sugar, so 
no processing cost adjustment was made. 
•  Finally, for the import commodities, the measurements are estimated at the 
regional level first and aggregated to give a country measure, using the share of 
regional production in total production as weights. The regional calculations 
cover 8 regions for rice, 2 (Java and off-Java) for maize, soybeans and sugar. For 
export commodities, crude palm oil and natural rubber, data were not available at 
the regional level and NPRs and PSEs are estimated at the national level.  
NPR results from the two studies cited in Table 4.1 are compared to our NPR 
results, which are developed in the next section, in Appendix Figure A.1 for the four 
import commodities.   21
  
Figure 4.1—Comparing reference price alternatives (1985-2003) 
 
a.  Rice        b.  Maize 
 
 
c.  Sugar        d.  Soybeans 
 




























































World Price cif equivalent Milled Paddy MUV  22
Table 4.1—Nominal protection rate measures for Indonesia (1985-2000) 
    Import crops (direct effects) 
Studies Years  Rice  Maize  Soybeans  Sugar 
Gonzales et al., 1993 
(average over regions)
1        
        
•  At producer price  1986  3  4  140  111 
        



































































































Sources:  Gonzales et al. (1993); Barichello (2003). 
Note:  
1 A negative indirect exchange-rate effect (-16 percent) was also estimated   23
Table 4.2—Empirical components of NPR estimates: definitions and sources for import crops 
  Import crops 
Category  Rice (1985-2003)  Maize (1985-2003)  Soybeans (1985-2003)  Sugar (1987-2003) 
        
Trade status Importable  Importable  Importable  Importable 
                    Source  <------------------------------------------------------- FAOSTAT 2004 ---------------------------------------------------> 
        
Reference domestic market Wholesale  Wholesale  Wholesale  Retail 
        
       Border Price         
  •  World Price (Pfob)  F.o.b. Bangkok, Thai 
broken  15%
1 
F.o.b. US gulf ports, 
Yellow No.2 
C.i.f. Import Unit 
Value 
F.o.b. Sugar-Caribbean 
   Sources  USDA-ERS (2003)   IFS (2004) on line and 
World Bank (2004) 
(various years) 
FAOSTAT (2004)  IFS (2004) on line and 
World Bank (2004) 
(various years) 
  •  International Freight (IF)
2  The IF costs range between 
17 and 27 percent of the 
world price depending on 
the region. 
The IF costs are 19 
percent in Java and 24 
percent off Java of the 
world price. 
Included in the import 
unit value.  
The IF costs are 47 
percent in Java and 58 
percent off Java of the 
world price.  
   Source  Gonzales et al., 1993  Gonzales et al., 1993    Gonzales et al., 1993 
          
  •  Exchange Rate (ER)  Monthly average for each 
year. 
Monthly average for 
each year. 
Monthly average for 
each year. 
Monthly average for 
each year. 
   Sources  <------------------------------------Bank of Indonesia (2002) and USDA-FAS (2004)--------------------------------> 
        
 Internal Cost Adjustments for importers  
    (TC: Port charges, handling, Transport  
      from port to wholesale market)
2 
5 percent of the border 
price, all regions. 
8 percent of the border 
price, all regions. 
5 percent of the border 
price, all regions. 
4 percent of the border 
price, all regions. 
   Source  <-----------------------------------------------Gonzales et al., 1993--------------------------------------------------> 
           
Domestic Price (farmgate or other)  Producer price of Paddy 
“sawah” irrigated rice. 
Producer price.  Producer price.  Retail price of refined 
sugar. 
   Sources Indonesia  Statistics,  (1998, 
2002) and USDA-FAS 
(2003b). 
Indonesia Statistics, 
(1998, 2002) and 
USDA-FAS (2003a) 
Indonesia Statistics,  
(1998, 2002) and 
USDA-FAS (2003b) 
Data files from 
ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/C
RESCENT (2004), and 
USDA-FAS (2003c)   24
Table 4.2—Empirical components of NPR estimates: definitions and sources for import crops---continued 
 
  Import crops 
Category Rice  Maize  Soybeans  Sugar 
      Internal Costs Adjustments for Domestic  
          Output (MM)
 2 
The MM costs average 33 
percent of the producer 
price milled equivalent. 
The MM costs are 15 
percent in Java and off 
Java of the producer 
price. 
The MM costs are 20 
percent in Java and 22 
percent off Java of the 
producer price for 
soybeans. 
Price already at retail 
market. No adjustment. 
   Source Authors  calculations
2  Gonzales et al., (1993)  Gonzales et al., (1993)   
        
Quality and Process Level Adjustments  Farmgate price of paddy is 
divided by the recovery 
factor, 0.62, to obtain a 
milled rice price equivalent.  
No adjustment.  No adjustment. No  adjustment. 
   Source IRRI,  (2003)      
            
Regional Coverage 
(The regional measures are averaged across 
regions using the share of the regional 
production in total production as weights) 
West Java, Central Java, 
East Java, West Sumatera, 
Rest of Sumatera, South 
Sulawesi, Rest of Sulawesi, 
and Rest of Indonesia. 
Java and off Java. 
 
Java and off Java. 
 
Java and off Java. 
 
            
 
Notes:  
1 Rice: For 1985 the world price is the monthly average for the year of Thai 5% parboiled; and for 2003 the world price is monthly average for 
the year of f.o.b.Thai broken 5% and Thai broken 15% (BULOG, 2003). For 2001 to 2003 the domestic prices at the regional level were not 
available and have been estimated using indices of rice prices received by farmers (Bank of Indonesia, various years).  
2 These margins are computed as a fixed percentage of the farmgate price. For rice, the rates are authors’ estimates based on observed national 
wholesale prices and consultation with Dave Dawe from IRRI. For the other crops the rates are derived from the 1986 values for these margins 
in Gonzales et al. (1993). Estimates of the international freight rates may be on the high side, overestimating the landed price of rice and 
therefore underestimating the protection. (Other authors have used a flat rate of $US10-20/mt and FAO estimated the freight rates in South 
Asia to be around $US25-30 in the 1990s).  
 
   25
Table 4.3—Empirical components of NPR estimates: definitions and sources for export 
crops 
 
 Export  Crops 
Category  Crude Palm Oil (1991-2003)  Natural Rubber (1985-2002) 
   
Trade status Exportable  Exportable 
   
Reference domestic market Wholesale  Wholesale 
   
        Border Price     
•  World price  F.o.b., export unit value of crude 
palm oil (CPO) 
F.o.b., export unit value of natural 
rubber 
                    Sources  FAOSTAT (2004) and USDA-FAS 
(2003b) 
FAOSTAT (2004) 
    
•  International freight  N/A N/A 
    
•  Exchange rate  Monthly average for each year.  Monthly average for each year. 
                    Sources  <--------------Bank of Indonesia (2002) and USDA-FAS (2004a)---------------> 
   
  Internal Cost Adjustments for 
     exporters (TC: Port charges,  
           handling, Transport from  
           wholesale market to port)
1 
4 percent of the border price  4 percent of the border price 
                    Source  <--------------------------Gonzales et al. (1993) 
2---------------------------------->
 
    
Domestic Price (farmgate or other)  Producer price of CPO  Wholesale price of natural rubber in 
Jakarta. 
                    Sources  FAOSTAT (2004) and USDA-FAS 
(2003b) 
Statistics Indonesia (1998, 2002) 
and FAOSTAT (2004)  
    
        Internal Costs Adjustments for  
            Domestic Output (MM)
 1 
5 percent of the producer price  No adjustment. 
                    Source  Donald F. Larson (1996)   
    
Regional Coverage 
 
Country level  Country level 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  
1 These margins are computed as a fixed share of the corresponding price. 
2  The rates are the same as those for sugar in Gonzales et al. (1993).   26
5.  NPR ESTIMATES FOR INDONESIA 
 
 
5.1  IMPORT CROPS (RICE, MAIZE, SOYBEANS, AND SUGAR) 
Rice (1985-2003)  
Indonesia is the world’s third largest producer of rice and the largest importer. 
Rice is the main staple and continues to be at the center of Indonesia food policies. It is 
grown by small-scale subsistence farmers and accounts for 65 percent of harvested area 
(Bahri, Kustiari, and Wittwer, 2000). Nearly 80 percent of rice is grown on irrigated 
lands, making it the heaviest aggregate user of water (Barichello, 2003). 
In the decade from 1975 to 1985, the government promoted rice through a 
combination of output price support and input subsidies, and production increased by 
about seven percent annually on average. Rice self-sufficiency was attained in the mid 
1980s, an impressive achievement considering that Indonesia was the world’s largest net 
importer of rice only five years earlier (Bautista et al., 1997). In the second half of the 
1990s, unexpected shortages made large imports necessary to keep prices below a ceiling 
level. During the period 1998-1999 large imports reflected decreased production in part 
from the drought brought on by El Niño. Self-sufficiency for rice increased from 82.2 
percent in 1998 to 95.4 percent in 2001. 
Prior to the financial crisis, the Suharto government stabilized domestic prices of 
rice by a combination of a price band (guaranteed floor price for producers and a ceiling 
price for consumers) and a monopoly on international trade by the state owned agency, 
BULOG. The prices were defended through BULOG’s control over international trade 
and the management of stocks. BULOG would purchase domestic rice to prevent the 
price from falling below the floor price, and release stocks or import rice to keep the 
price below the ceiling. In addition, the government promoted production through the 
development of new rice varieties, which required investment in irrigation and subsidized 
fertilizers.  The combination of stable prices and new technology succeeded in achieving   27
the goal of self-sufficiency. The program was successful in promoting the rice sector and 
oil revenues supported the large costs associated with it. BULOG was successful in 
stabilizing domestic prices, but kept them in trend with world prices overall (Timmer, 
2002). Consequently, private traders felt confident about their activities (marketing 
margins were wide enough to allow them a profit) and they could complement and 
simplify BULOG’s operations (BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI, 2002c; Barichello, 2003).  
BULOG’s procurements averaged around 10 percent of domestic production, the rest is 
mostly consumed directly by farmers' households or marketed by private traders.   
Reforms undertaken in 1998 were largely part of the IMF structural adjustment 
program with the exception of rice. Because of corruption in BULOG, the Government 
decided unilaterally to eliminate BULOG's import monopoly for rice as well and open the 
domestic and trade markets for rice (Magiera, 2003).. In 1998, rice trade was liberalized 
and trade was entrusted to private traders. Control was returned to BULOG when private 
traders were unable to maintain the floor price (Wailes, 2003).  In January 2000, a rice 
tariff of Rp 430/kg (about 30 percent) became effective. In spite of the removal of 
BULOG’s import monopoly, the state-owned enterprise can still be authorized by the 
GOI to restrict import when domestic prices fall below a certain threshold or to prevent a 
rice glut (WTO, 2003b).  In January 13, 2004, Oryza (2004) reported that BULOGs 
delayed “400,000 metric tons of rice imports from Thailand and Vietnam from January to 
August to help local farmers ... the delay is aimed at preventing the price of rice in the 
domestic market from falling below 1,725 rupiah (US$1=Rp8,327) a kilogram.”  
Although, its role has changed BULOG continues to provide support to rice producers, 
stabilize prices though domestic procurement, and distribute rice to the poor.  
Figure 5.1 shows the results of nominal protection rates for rice computed for the 
period 1985-2003. At the beginning of the period, protection is high reflecting the 
continued efforts from the early 1980s of government to promote rice production in order 
to attain self-sufficiency. During the following period, 1987 to 1997, the pattern is 
consistent with the policy of stabilization. The nominal rates are mostly positive (between   28
4 and 26 percent) except in the late 1980s when world rice prices surge (negative NPRs 
of 8 and 11 percent). By the 1990s, domestic prices keep in trend with world prices 
overshooting slightly (see movement of the world and domestic prices in Figure 5.2). The 
devaluation in 1998 explains negative protection of –44 percent. Although domestic 
prices were raised in 1998, the border price of rice (c.i.f.) increased by even more due to 
the depreciation (Barichello, 2003). When compared to Barichello’s NPRs, the estimates 
herein show similar movements for the overlapping years (Appendix Figure A.1). 
According to Wailes (2003) the non-tariff barriers resulted in a much higher tariff 
rate equivalent (75 percent) than the 30 percent due to the import duties. The non-tariff 
barriers include customs regulations like the use of the red lane or channel, which 
requires imported goods to undergo physical examination and a check of their declared 
value (WTO, 2003b), and the newly created special import number for certain 
commodities (NPIK) (BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI, 2002b).  When comparing the actual 
retail price in Jakarta to the import parity price of Indian 15% broken rice, 
BAPPENAS/USAID/DAI (2002b) estimates the protection equivalent to 98.5 percent in 
Jan-May 2002.  In our analysis, the NPRs for the period  2001-2003, ranging from 25 to 
58 percent are more consistent with the 30 percent tariff. Still,  it reflects the suspicion 
borne in the literature that the protection for rice has slipped higher than reflected in the 
import tariff (Figure 5.1; Table 5.1). And the current political pressure is for this 
protection to go up (Timmer, 2002; Barichello, 2003).    
Maize (1985-2003) 
Although maize is increasingly used in cattle-feed (it constitutes 50 percent of the 
animal-feed components), 80 percent of production is for human consumption. The main 
producing regions are Java and Sumatera, with 60 and 20 percent of total production, 
respectively in 2003 (USDA-FAS, 2003a). 
In 1989, BULOG ceased to exert monopoly control over maize imports and over 
inter-island and inter-provincial marketing (Bahri, Kustiari and Wittwer, 2000). By 1990   29
the government discontinued the setting of the floor price for maize (initiated in 1978).  
Bautista et al. (1998) observed that the support price had proved to be redundant as the 
producer price was consistently higher than the floor price.  Maize, like other agricultural 
commodities, benefited from input subsidies, implemented to encourage the use of 
improved technology, before being gradually reduced, due to budgetary considerations, 
and removed in 1999. In trade policy, the main instrument was an import tariff of 10 
percent on maize imports until 1994 when it was reduced to 5 percent (USDA-FAS, 
1995a), and eventually removed in 1995 (Bahri, Kustiari and Wittwer, 2000). 
The market support measures for maize show positive protection during the mid-
1980s while under BULOG’s control. The continued positive NPRs ranging from 4 to 25 
percent in the mid-1990s is somewhat puzzling given the absence of any direct 
government policy regarding maize. Notwithstanding the usual caveats associated with 
computing indicators of support, the results may reflect the effects of non-tariff barriers 
such as import licensing schemes.
16 After dropping to –38 percent, due to the 
devaluation, the NPR estimates for maize indicate positive protection at slightly lower 
levels than the first half of the 1990s (Figures 5.3 and 5.4; Table 5.1). 
Soybeans (1985-2003)  
Indonesia is the world’s ninth largest producer and importer of soybeans 
(Mattson, Sun, and Koo, 2004). Production has been declining (45 percent from 1990-92 
to 2000-02) mostly due to a decline in harvested area of (52 percent during the same 
period). Prior to 1995/96, 10-12 percent of soybeans produced domestically were used for 
feed. With the only soybeans crushing plant closed, domestic production is almost 
entirely used for human consumption (in the form of tofu and Tempe) while whole 
soybeans and soybean meal are imported (Douvalis, 1999). 
                                                 
16 When interviewing traders in the mid-1990s, Steve Magiera found ad-hoc evidence that excessive port 
costs added 5 to 10 percent to the price of imported maize when compared with neighboring countries. 
In our study, these costs are not included in the landed cost of imported maize, but if they were they 
would reduce the calculated NPR for maize.   30
In 1986, the GOI included soybeans among the commodities (along with rice and 
sugar) subject to policies aimed at self-sufficiency through the implementation of 
intensification programs.  Import control through BULOG’s monopoly on imports and 
distribution insulated the domestic price of soybeans from the world market (Bahri, 
Kustiari, and Wittwer, 2000).  From the late 1980s until 1996, these monopoly rights 
were passed on to a private soybeans crushing firm.
17 During that period, imports were 
brought and sold in the domestic market at a fixed price to KOPTI (manufacturer 
cooperatives) above import rates and to local traders at higher “market” prices: an 
incentive to producers and higher profits for BULOG and later to the sole crushing firm 
(Douvalis, 1999). 
Indonesia continues to be a net importer of soybeans. In 1995 soybean trade was 
deregulated (except for yellow soybeans), the import tariff was reduced from 10 to 5 
percent, and the value added tax (VAT) was removed (USDA-FAS, 1995b). The tariff on 
soybeans was removed as part of the 1998 reforms following the financial crisis 
(Barichello, 2003). 
The decreasing nominal protection rates after 1995 (except for the 1999 rebound 
following the devaluation) reflects these reforms (Figure 5.5). Given the elimination of 
government interventions in the soybean market, the NPR is expected to continue to 
decline, with the domestic price following movement in the world price (Figure 5.6; 
Table 5.1) unless pressure to introduce a new tariff prevails. USDA-FAS (2004a) reports 
that the GOI is discussing the possibility of an import duty for soybeans of 30 percent 
while the Ministry of Agriculture is planning to subsidize prices of seeds and fertilizer for 
soybean production (USDA-FAS, 2004a). 
Sugar (1985-2003)  
Until the late 1980s, smallholder farmers accounted for almost 80 percent of cane 
production, the result of GOI’s sugarcane intensification program (Rusastra, Suprihatini, 
                                                 
17 Although BULOG retained control.   31
and Iqbal, 1999), but this proportion has decreased to 55 percent. The remaining share is 
split evenly between national and private large-scale plantations (USDA-FAS, 2004b). 
The two major producing areas are Java, which accounts for around 63 percent (a 
decreased from 75 percent in 1995) and Lampung (Sumatera), which accounts for 29 
percent of total production.   In Java, where the share of sugar production in irrigated land 
has decreased, sugar has to compete with other alternative crops especially rice, which 
has had higher returns (Rusastra, Suprihatini, and Iqbal, 1999).  
The majority of the 59 sugar mills are state owned enterprises (52), which 
produce 68 percent of Indonesia’s sugar production (USDA-FAS, 2004b). In spite of the 
government’s efforts to develop domestic production, imports continue to be substantial 
and the self-sufficiency index dropped from 0.85 in 1970 to 0.63 in 1997 (Rusastra, 
Suprihatini, and Iqbal, 1999).  Smallholder farmers continue to face outdated techniques 
in production, high input prices, and despite programs like KKP, little access to credit 
making it hard to compete with world sugar markets (USDA-FAS, 2004b).   
Sugar was heavily protected prior to the 1998 reforms in an attempt to reach self-
sufficiency as with rice. In the early 1970s BULOG was given the role of stabilizing 
prices and distributing sugar. In 1981, BULOG was given monopoly on sugar imports 
and domestic procurement (Rusastra, Suprihatini, and Iqbal, 1999).  The government set 
the price structure for sugar, which consisted of a provenue (manufactured primary price) 
and ex-factory price. The farmer shared with the mills the set price: farmers received 62 
to 70 percent of the sugar extraction value of the cane and the mills received the 
remaining share (USDA-FAS, 1995c). 
Starting in 1997 the government issued a series of deregulation packages (partly 
self-initiated but also in concordance with its IMF commitment), which removed 
BULOG’s monopoly control and allowed all traders to import sugar and market it 
domestically; released farmers from the formal and informal requirements for planting of 
sugar cane; and removed all consumer price subsidies by 1998. In spite of these reforms, 
BULOG effectively maintained its full monopoly over sugar imports (due to exclusive   32
access to a subsidized exchange rate) and distribution until the end of 1998 when its 
monopoly control over sugar was eliminated (USDA-FAS, 1998).  
Import licensing (to sugar millers) continued until 2000 when it was replaced by 
20 and 25 percent tariffs for raw and refined sugar, respectively. In 2002 the GOI started 
restricting imports of raw and refined sugar for processing to three state sugarmills.  
Registered importers could only import semi-refined sugar when farmgate prices of local 
sugar are higher than Rp. 3,100/kg (a “breakeven point” for domestic producers).  The 
government also notified the WTO of new standards for raw sugar to be applied to local 
and imported sugar and import ad-valerum tariffs were replaced by specific import duties 
of Rp. 550/kg for raw sugar and Rp. 700/kg for white sugar (Haley and Suarez, 2003). 
The values of protection, estimated by the NPR in Figure 5.7, are consistent with 
the mix of sugar policies from the GOI during this period. The NPR series compares the 
import unit value of imported sugar, which is mostly refined and of better quality than the 
domestically produced sugar, with the wholesale price in Jakarta of domestically 
produced sugar, which is an average price of refined and centrifugal raw sugar. So the 
NPR is computed ex-factory and expresses the subsidies to the millers and farmers 
jointly.  Rising world sugar prices in the late 1980s, meant that producers were 
disprotected because they faced a fixed domestic price (Figure 5.8). 
Price incentives to increase sugar production resulted in high protection, between 
21 and 74 percent in the 1990s, except during 1997 due to the Rupiah devaluation 
(Figures 5.7 and 5.8; Table 5.1).  Imports continued to be heavy due to poor performance 
by Indonesia sugar industry and falling world prices (Haley and Suarez, 2003). The 
official import figures do not include illegal imports estimated in 2003/2004 to be as high 
as 500,000 metric tons, a third of total imports. The rising trend in protection illustrates 
the import restrictions established after 2002 and the high breakeven point for sugar 
production relative to falling world prices (USDA-FAS, 2004b). 
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5.2  EXPORT CROPS (CRUDE PALM OIL AND NATURAL RUBBER) 
Crude Palm Oil (1991-2003) 
Crude palm oil (CPO) world production and exports are dominated by Malaysia 
and Indonesia.  Indonesia is the second largest producer (34 percent of the world total 
production), exporter (28 percent of world exports), and consumer (14 percent of world 
consumption) of CPO (Mattson, Sun, and Koo, 2004). 
The oil palm subsector in Indonesia expanded consistently from the late 1960s 
until 1997. Most of the growth came from the large privately owned estates and 
smallholders production, with less growth from state owned estates production (Figure 
5.9). In the mid 1980s, smallholders were producing 7 percent of total production while 
state owned estates and privately owned estates produced 65 and 27 percent, respectively. 
But by the late 1990s, the share of smallholders production rose to 24 percent, that of 
privately owned estates to 43 percent and government owned decreased to 33 percent 
(Hasan, Reed, and Marchant, 2001).  Production has also expanded outside of Sumatera, 
which still accounts for more than 90 percent of total oil palm production, into 
Kalimantan.   
The GOI, set on achieving first place in world palm oil production by 2003, 
contributed to the growth of the private sector output by providing credit subsidies to 
private developers from the mid-1980s. The area planted increased by five fold from 
600,000 hectares in 1985 to 3 million hectares in 1999 (van Gelder, 2001). This served 
also the smallholders, who benefited since the late 1970s from the PIR/NES scheme 
(Nucleus Estate and Smallholder scheme) and subsequent programs: PIR-Trans (1986-
1994) and the KKPA (1995-1995). Under the PIR/NES scheme, private developers 
prepared plots of land, which they would transfer to smallholders upon maturity (3 to 4 
years).  Still the large-scale private sector dominates the industry, owning more than 51 
percent of the area planted (Casson, 2000).   34
In 1991, the GOI removed all trade restrictions on palm oil products, which had 
been regulated since 1978 (export tax and domestic price control). The trade 
liberalization policies resulted in an increase in Indonesia export shares of palm oil in the 
world market from 1.6 percent in 1984 to 13 percent in 1991 and 23 percent in 1997;  and 
in a sharp increase in the retail price of palm cooking oil.
18 The rise in price induced the 
government to implement an export tax on palm oil products in August 1994  (Marks, 
Larson, and Pomeroy, 1998; Hasan, Reed, and Marchant, 2001), and to maintain through 
BULOG a permanent buffer stock (USDA-FAS, 1997). The export tax rate schedule for 
crude palm oil and its products depended on a domestic target price (specified in dollars 
per metric tons) and was applied only if the f.o.b.export price was above the target price. 
Between September 1994 and December 1995, the average export tax was 11.36 percent 
and 14.45 percent of the export price for crude palm oil and palm cooking oil, 
respectively. When the world prices for these products came down after January 1996, 
the respective tax rates were 6.39 and 6.73 (Marks, Larson, and Pomeroy, 1998). 
Between January 1998 and August 1999, the GOI implemented a series of policy 
changes, starting with a three-month ban on exports of crude palm oil (CPO) and its 
products. The ban was replaced by an export tax rate of 40 percent, increasing to 60 
percent in July 1998, and back to 40 percent in January 1999, decreasing to 30 and 10 
percent by the end of 1999 (Casson, 2000: Appendix 5).  By 2000 the export tax rate was 
set at 5 percent in view of Malaysia’s decision to eliminate its CPO duty, and India, the 
major importer, to raise taxes on edible oil imports (USDA-FAS, 2000). The current rate 
is 3 percent, but in spite of abundant supplies, Indonesia is experiencing lower level 
carry-over stock in 2003 because both exports and domestic utilization have increased. 
This situation may induce the GOI to increase both the target price and the export tax 
(USDA-FAS, 2003b). 
                                                 
18 Palm oil is an important source of Indonesian cooking oil replacing coconut oil as the prominent edible 
oil consumed in Indonesia (Hasan, Reed, and Marchant, 2001). Indonesia domestic consumption reaches 
above 50 percent of its CPO production, compared with Malaysia, which consumes 10 percent of its 
production.   35
GOI’s policies on palm oil and its products have been consistent with its concerns 
to provide sufficient raw material for domestic processing industries and to maintain low 
prices for consumers of palm oil based cooking oil. Indonesia’s palm oil sector is very 
efficient and the country is acquiring sufficient CPO factories to process the production 
of palm fruit (USDA-FAS, 2003b). Consequently, the sector is very profitable on the 
international and domestic markets (Voituriez, 2001). 
Figure 5.1 shows NPRs for CPO for the years 1991 to 2003.  Before the crisis, 
policies seemed to have been aimed at stabilizing domestic prices.
 19 The removal of trade 
restrictions in 1991 allowed domestic prices to rise as exports increased causing shortages 
in the domestic supply. In 1994, the export tax schedule was introduced maintaining the 
domestic price in line with the f.o.b. price and reducing exports for the next two years, 
resulting in an NPR varying between –10 and 11 percent.  The negative NPR of nearly –
50 percent in 1998 reflects the devaluation of the rupiah, which pushes world prices up in 
domestic currency. GOI’s interventions between 1997 and the end of 1998 succeeded in 
increasing domestic prices but they remained well below the international US dollar price 
(Figure 5.11; Table 5.1; Voituriez, 2001). The NPR becomes positive in 1999 and starts 
to increase. One explanation for this positive protection in spite of export taxes is the 
nature of the Indonesian oil market, which is controlled by a few large private companies 
with political connections. Comparing the Malaysian and Indonesian markets, Voituriez 
(2001) notes: “… the Indonesian domestic market has a strongly integrated distribution 
chain, is burdened with an oligopoly in oil processing and selling and suffers from an 
absolute lack of transparency in price setting.” As the export tax rate continues to 
decrease (3 percent in 2003), domestic prices follow the movement in international 
prices, which start climbing (Figure 5.11).  
                                                 
19 Producer prices prior to 1991 were not available from the FAOSTAT data base, but between 1985 and 
1991, CPO domestic prices were fixed by the GOI, ranging between Rp 400/kg and Rp 570/kg 
(Voituriez, 2001).   36
Natural Rubber (1985-2002) 
Indonesia accounts for 23 percent of the world’s rubber production and 28 percent 
of world exports (2000-2002 average) making it the world’s second largest producer and 
exporter of rubber after Thailand  (FAOSTAT, 2004). Indonesia has 3.4 million hectares 
of rubber plantation, with a total output of 1.6 million tons, of which 1.4 million tons are 
exported (Laksamana.net, 2001). 
Smallholder rubber covers 83 percent of the total Indonesian rubber area (2.4 
hectares harvested area) and contributes more than 75 percent of the total rubber 
production in Indonesia.  The smallholder’s dominant share in production accounts for 
Indonesia having the lowest cost production in the range of US$ 0.86 per kg against 0.95 
to 1.06 in other countries (1995). But “jungle rubber” does not provide a good income for 
rubber farmers and rubber estates have gradually been converted to oil palm plantations, 
which have become much more profitable (Budiman, 1996).
20   
In the 1980s and 1990s, the GOI encouraged the development of “clonal” rubber 
plantations which contrary to the traditional system depend much more on high-level 
inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides). The GOI provided packages of credit and 
cultivation technology to change the smallholder rubber system. The new system, which 
affects only 15 percent of smallholder producers, has been hard to sustain due to the 
requirement of capital, credit, available planting material and technical information, 
especially following the disengagement of the GOI from the rubber sector in 1999 (Penot 
and Trouillard, 2002). 
At the end of 2001, responding to a 30-year low price and weak demand, the 
world’s top three natural rubber producers, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, agreed to a 
number of cooperative measures in an effort to increase prices under the formation of a 
consortium, the International Tripartite Rubber Company (ITRCo).  These measures 
                                                 
20 Jungle rubber, a dominant rubber cultivation system in Indonesia, “… begins with forest clearing and 
burning and both rice and rubber are planted. Rice is harvested for two years, and the plot is then left to 
revert to forest. After about eight years, a rubber-rich secondary forest results.” (Chomitz and Griffts, 
1996).     37
included agreed export volume limits and a supply management scheme aimed at cutting 
back annual production by 4 percent in 2002 and 2003.   From February 2002, Indonesia 
has allocated annual export quotas of 1.23 million tonnes, as part of the plan to reduce 
exports by 10 percent.  The export quotas apply when the international price of rubber 
falls below an agreed reference price, which is not publicly released.  Quotas are 
allocated to exporters by the industry on the basis of previous export sales.  According to 
authorities, Indonesia has not applied the quota since mid 2002 when the world price rose 
above reference levels (WTO, 2003b).  
Prior to 1997 NPRs show that domestic rubber prices have moved with world 
prices (Figures 5.12 and 5.13). The closeness between the two prices results from 
Indonesia being a major producer and exporter of rubber, in close proximity with the two 
other largest producers and exporters. The rubber sector shows the effects of the 1997/98 
financial crisis earlier than the other crops. A quick rebound was due to a surge in 
domestic prices while international prices continued to decline, overshadowing the 
effects of the devaluation (Figure 5.13).  Following the decline in world prices, which 
precipitated the ITRCo agreement, there has been a sharp increase in world prices 
matched by rising domestic prices.   38
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Sources: Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.2 for details).  
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Source: Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.2 for details).   39
Figure 5.3—Maize: net exports and NPR (1985-2003) 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.2 for details). 
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Figure 5.5—Soybeans: net exports and NPR (1985-2003) 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.2 for details).    
 
Figure 5.6—Soybeans: world and domestic prices (1985-2003) 
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Figure 5.7—Sugar: net exports and NPR (1985-2003) 
Source:  Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.2 for details).   
 
Figure 5.8—Sugar: world and domestic prices (1987-2003) 
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Figure 5.9—Production structure by owner type for CPO (1985-2001) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Casson (2000). 
 
 
Figure 5.10—CPO: net exports (1985-2003) and NPR (1991-2003) 
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Figure 5.11—CPO: world (1985-2003) and domestic prices (1991-2003) 
Source:  Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.3 for details). 
 
Figure 5.12—Natural rubber: net exports and NPR (1985-2002) 
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Figure 5.13—Natural rubber: world (1985-2003) and domestic prices (1985-2002) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Table 4.3 for details). 
 
Table 5.1—Nominal protection rates for PSE Commodities (1985-2003) 
  Rice
  Maize Soybeans Sugar  CPO 
Natural 
rubber 
1985 42  -6  86      -5 
1986 44  21  117      -18 
1987 2  27  95  13    6 
1988 -8  -2  58  -24    -3 
1989 -11  -3  39  -36    0 
1990 6  4  80  -31    -3 
1991 4  13  84 -7  11  -4 
1992 14  7  80 65  35  -3 
1993 22  16  89 51  44  0 
1994 26  25  81 21  25  10 
1995 16  20  84 37  -10  5 
1996 11  -2  70 50  11  1 
1997 12  12  50  -18  -1 -43 
1998 -44  -38  -9 11  -49  21 
1999 19  11  62 67  3  18 
2000 26  12  50  7  5 -11 
2001 25  16  47 14  23  6 
2002 55  11  16 36  12  8 
2003 58  17  6  100  17   
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6.  PSE ESTIMATES FOR INDONESIA 
 
In this section, MPSs and PSEs are evaluated for the six agricultural commodities 
and aggregate PSEs are estimated. PSEs include both price support and budgetary 
payments but in developing countries, due to fewer fiscal revenues, often the budgetary 
component of the PSE is empirically not as important as in developed countries and 
arises primarily from government subsidies in the input sector. The MPS for Indonesia 
are measured based on the prices defined and used in the NPR calculations and the 
budgetary payments, irrigation and fertilizer subsidies, are estimated from development 
expenditures data (ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/CRESCENT, 2004: Appendix Table 5.1).  
 
6.1  PSE METHODOLOGY 
 
The OECD defines the PSE as a measure of the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers that results from 
government domestic and trade policies.  It is characterized as a nominal protection 
indicator, which measures the nominal assistance and does not take into account the 
protection of tradable inputs (OECD, 1999 and 2002).  
 
The PSE includes two components:  
 
•  A market price support (MPS), which is a commodity specific measure and 
•  The sum of government budgetary payments to agricultural producers, which may 
include commodity specific as well as non-commodity specific transfers.   
The MPS assesses effects of government policies which isolate agricultural 
producers from movements in world prices or exchange rate variations, or which 
otherwise create a gap between the world and domestic price. Like the more traditional 
measure of support, the Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), the MPS measures the 
gap between the price agricultural producers received for their production (producer 
price) and the one they would have received (reference price) in the absence of   46
government interventions (border measures such as tariff or import licensing, domestic 
price support, procurement and distribution monopolies by state-owned enterprises, and 
subsidized exports).  In the case of the MPS, the price wedge is multiplied by production 
to assess the income effect on producers.  
As in the case of nominal protection, the choice of the border price depends on the 
trade status of the commodity (c.i.f. prices for imports and f.o.b. prices for exports). Once 
identified, the border price must also be adjusted to make it comparable to the domestic 
equivalent, in terms of location, quality, and process level. OECD measures the PSE at 
the farmgate level so the reference price must be adjusted accordingly.  
In the notation of equation 1, the MPS and PSE for a specific commodity can be 
expressed in monetary terms: 
 
  ( ) pa r MPS P P Q = −×   (5) 
 
  PSE MPS BP = +    (6) 
 
where:
             :production 





This result can also be expressed as percentage PSE, which reflects the share of 
gross farm receipts derived from policies: 
 







  (7) 
 
PSEs are aggregated across all commodities covered (representing the bulk of a 
country’s agricultural trade) to give a single indicator of support for the country (see 
Mullen et al., 2004 for full discussion of the PSE measurement).   47
6.2  BUDGETARY PAYMENTS: INPUT SUBSIDIES 
Fertilizer subsidies have been used to assist mainly rice and sugar farmers, in 
order to promote self-sufficiency. The GOI provided cheaper fertilizer to farmers, mostly 
smallholders, while large estates users did not benefit from the subsidy.  The subsidies, 
which were only applied to nitrogenous fertilizers (urea), were successful in increasing 
fertilizer usage from 676 thousand tons in 1975 to 4,290 thousand tons in 1998 at an 
estimated cost of Rp2,257 billions in 1997/1998  (ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/CRESCENT, 
2004: Tables 7.6 and 7.7). The subsidies had been implemented since the 1970s, and put 
a heavy burden on the government budgets, estimated at 40 percent of the agriculture and 
irrigation development budget (Fuglie, 2001 and 2003). 
Fertilizers subsidies were eliminated in 1997, but reintroduced for food crops the 
same year, and removed again in December 1998. In 2001 the direct subsidy to fertilizer 
was replaced by requiring the state-owned petroleum company to provide subsidized gas 
to the state-owned urea fertilizer manufacturers. The gas subsidy was eliminated in 2002. 
In 2003, the direct subsidy was reintroduced and applied to specific fertilizers. The GOI 
pays the subsidy to the state-owned fertilizer manufacturers, which pass it on to farmers 
through lower prices. The goal is to reduce the urea price to small-scale farmers of rice 
(as well as horticulture) 15 to 20 percent (ADB/SEARCA/IFPRI/CRESCENT, 2004: 
Chapter 7).  Because the subsidies do not apply to imported fertilizer and benefit only 
small farmers, it creates a dual pricing structure and opportunities for abuse and leakage 
(Ringler, Rodgers, and Rosegrant, 2003).  
In the PSE calculations, the fertilizer subsidy by crop is estimated from the GOI 
development budget. Rice is allocated 70 percent of the subsidies and the remainder is 
allocated to the PSE commodities according to their share in total crop production.  The 
available data series is interrupted for 2000-2002, but the budgetary cost of the subsidy   48
for 2003 was estimated to be Rp1,315 billion (Ross, 1990; Ringler, Rodgers, and 
Rosegrant, 2003).
21  
To estimate the irrigation subsidies, it is assumed that 85 percent of irrigation 
expenditures from the government budget are subsidies and that 80 percent of this 
subsidy is allotted to rice (Ross, 1990).  The remaining estimated subsidy is allocated to 
the PSE commodities according to their share in total crop production 
The relative size of fertilizer and irrigation subsidies has changed over the period 
1985-2000. While in the mid-1980s, fertilizers subsidies accounted for nearly two third of 
the total, its relative share dropped in the 1990s to below 10 percent before being 
eliminated completely in 2000.  On the other hand irrigation subsidies have been 
increasing in absolute and relative terms particularly during the mid-1990s (Fuglie and 
Piggot, 2003: Table 5). 
In addition to fertilizers and irrigation subsidies, farmers have benefited 
increasingly from subsidized farm credit: the coverage of crops eligible has increased as 
well as the ceiling of allocated credit funds (from Rp150 billion in 1997 to Rp3,500 
billion in 1998 and Rp6,500 billion in 1999). The interest rate of farm credit, 10.5 
percent, is also much lower than current market interest rates of 30 percent (Bahri, 
Kustiari, and Wittwer, 2000), The credit subsidy is not included here because of lack of 
access to a consistent time series data for the period covered, an omission which 
underestimates the budgetary payments component of the PSE and therefore the PSEs. 
 
6.3  NOMINAL PSE CALCULATIONS  
To compute the commodity-specific PSEs for Indonesia, we follow the OECD 
basic methodology, taking into account some of the alternative measures discussed in 
Mullen et al. (2004).  
                                                 
21 The budgeted figure is usually different for the realized expenditure, and may overestimate the actual 
subsidy.   49
The border and domestic price estimates used in the MPS are identical to those 
used to compute the NPRs. Commodities are either assumed to be importable (rice, 
maize, soybeans, and sugar) or exportable (palm oil and rubber) based on their net trade 
patterns.  For the imported commodities the MPS calculations are carried out at the state 
level and then aggregated to give a national value (see Table 4.2 for details).  The 
regional price data was not available for export commodities and so in that case, only the 
national calculations apply. The budgetary payments are the sum of the fertilizer and 
irrigation subsidies discussed in the previous section.   
A commodity-specific PSE can be expressed in monetary value per unit of output 
aggregated for the total production of the specific commodity or as a percentage of the 
income the farmer receives with respect to that commodity. This last measure, as reported 
by OECD, calculates income the farmer receives based on the value of production at 
domestic prices plus budget payments (Equation 7). We also compute an alternative (the 
“trade economist’s”) approach, which expresses the farmer’s income as the value of 










  (8) 
 
This last indicator is very close to the corresponding NPR, which is also 
computed relative to the reference price, but the numerator now includes the budgetary 
payments. 
The total PSE for the country expressed in nominal terms is the sum of the 
aggregate MPS (for all agriculture) and the total budgetary payments.  Following Mullen 
et al. (2004), we present two ways of computing the aggregate MPS.  
The first way to estimate the aggregate PSE is to assume that the MPS of non-
covered commodities is zero, and the aggregate MPS is the sum of commodity-specific   50
MPS for the covered commodities (rice, maize, soybeans, sugar, crude palm oil, and 
natural rubber), labeled MPSc. 
  
  cj MPS MPS =∑    (9) 
  
 
  cc PSE MPS BP = +   (10) 
 
where:
              : covered commodities




The second way to estimate the aggregate PSE is to assume that the MPS of non-
covered commodities is equal to the weighted average of MPSc, and the aggregate MPS 
is a “scale-up” value of MPSc,  based on the share of the covered commodities in the total 






=    (11) 
       
  PSE MPS BP = +     (12) 
 
where:
             : share of the covered commodities in the total value of
                production
k      
This second method is the one used by OECD. For each of these procedures, we 
apply the OECD and “trade economist’s” approaches to the denominator. 
Commodity-Specific PSEs 
Commodities-specific results are summarized in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, which show 
the %PSE (OECD denominator) for imported and exported commodities, respectively. 
As expected, the commodity %PSE figures reflect closely the results from the NPRs, but 
augmented by the budgetary transfers. With the exception of the late 1980s (for rice and   51
sugar) and 1997/98 crisis (for all crops), import commodities have been protected. While 
support for maize and soybeans shows a declining trend, support for rice and sugar, is 
rising (Figure 6.1; Appendix Tables A.1a-d).   
Results for exported commodities show that palm oil has been protected except 
for 1995 (implementation of the export tax structure) and 1998 (devaluation of the 
rupiah). Rubber shows little protection or disprotection because the domestic price 
movements are consistent with movements in the world prices, which can be influenced 
by Indonesia’s production and trade activities combined with that of its large producing 
neighbors, Thailand and Malaysia (Figure 6.2; Appendix Tables A.1e-f). 
For some commodities results can vary across regions. In 1985, support for rice 
was twice as high in the off-Java regions (Sumatera and Sulawesi) than in Java where 
more than half the rice is produced, but in 1998, with the devaluation effect, the same 
regions were disprotected at a much higher rate than Java. In 2003, rice producers in the 
Rest of Sulawesi were disprotected while protection increased in the rest of the country 
(Table 6.1).  Regional variability also makes a difference for maize in Java, where 
producers benefited from more support in the late 1980s and early 1990s but the pattern 
switched in the second half of the 1990s. The results for the last three years (2001-2003) 
indicate much less variability accross the two regions (Figure 6.3). 
The Aggregate PSE Measures 
Aggregate PSE results clearly show that Indonesia has been subsidizing its 
agriculture somewhat, especially since the 1990s (Figure 6.4). The level of protection has 
a counter-cyclical component, with  disprotection when world prices are relatively high 
(as in the late 1980s and mid 1990s) and protection when world prices are lower. The 
effects of the devaluation of the Rupiah during the financial crisis (1997/1998) is also 
evident. The domestic value of international prices jumped to very high level, and 
domestic prices followed with a lag. The Rupiah stabilized at a higher level and the gap   52
between domestic and international prices returned to pre-crisis levels. The last three 
years show an increasing trend in protection. 
The aggregate PSEs show that the MPS estimates are the dominant component of 
the PSE. This is especially noticeable in the last five years when the MPS estimates are 
positive and account between 91 and 98 percent of the PSE. The share of the value of 
production shows that the six PSE commodities capture more than two-thirds of the total 
agriculture (Table 6.2).
22  
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4 show the results of  “scaling-up” in calculating the PSE 
(see Equations 7 and 8). On this basis, PSE is larger in magnitude than PSEc, except 
when MSPc is very small relative to BP (1990-1991 and 1997), rendering the values 
almost equal. 
The results shown for %PSE in Figure 6.4 utilize the standard OECD 
denominator (production valued at domestic prices plus budget payments). Results using 
values of production at reference prices (trade economist’s denominator) are also shown 
in Table 6.2. The “trade economist” %PSE values indicate higher protection (or less 
disprotection) than the OECD %PSE values.  
                                                 
22 This share may be somewhat inflated because production for the PSE commodities is valued at wholesale 
prices and sometimes retail prices (depending on the domestic prices used in the comparison) while the 
total value of agricultural production is valued at producer prices (FAOSTAT, 2003).     53





















Rice Maize Soybeans Sugar  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 6.2—Percent PSE for exported commodities (1985-2003) 
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Figure 6.3—Regional estimates of maize %MPS (1985-2003) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6.1—Regional estimates of rice %MPS (1985-2003) 
 West  Central  East  West  Rest of  South  Rest of  Rest of 
 Java  Java  Java  Sumatera  Sumatera Sulawesi Sulawesi Indonesia 
               
1985 20 36  30  75  61 40 74  36 
1986  39  52  44 70 47  2  38 11 
1987 -2  10  6 13  0  -22 -4  -23 
1988 -12  0  -7  14  -9 -32 -16  -31 
1989 -16  -8  -14  8  -3 -28 -42  -30 
1990 2 8  1  20  18  -16  -1  -21 
1991 0 6  0  24  20  -24  -8  -24 
1992 8  15  10  37  23  -11 7  -11 
1993 14 18  17  35  36  2 42  -7 
1994 23 31  26  21  28  5 45  -7 
1995 14 21  13  25  14  -2 34  -6 
1996 7  16  7  15  6 7  -6 -5 
1997 8  14  12  23  6 7  -9 -7 
1998 -43 -42  -44  -51  -51 -44 -56  -48 
1999 18 12  18  -9  11 20 29  13 
2000  18  15  19 35 31  9  41 23 
2001  21  16  20 23 30  2  45 18 
2002 57 62  75  16  35 19 24  34 
2003 62 60  49  18  49 44 10  59 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   56
Table 6.2—Indonesia total PSEs (1985-2003) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
Measured Support
     MPSc 2867 3313 1109 -1353 -2545 1125 1786 5314 7145 8410 6846 6001 2774 -68755 22375 19968 27004 48254 52773
     BP 1126 891 669 1078 649 705 925 1115 1107 1221 2246 1880 2151 2776 6131 2933 1813 1298 1315
Covered Share 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.82 0.93 0.95 0.81 0.46 0.72 0.59 0.57 0.75 0.78
MPS 4789 6033 2010 -2132 -3965 1727 2515 7226 9837 10206 7392 6293 3425 -150588 30867 33847 47441 64320 67585
PSE 
     PSEc 3993 4205 1778 -274 -1895 1830 2711 6429 8253 9631 9092 7881 4925 -65979 28506 22901 28817 49552 54088
     PSE 5915 6924 2679 -1054 -3315 2432 3439 8340 10945 11427 9637 8173 5576 -147812 36998 36780 49254 65618 68900
Exchange Rate (Rp/US$) 1115 1283 1643 1717 1787 1882 1982 2051 2095 2160 2239 2348 2953 9875 7809 8527 10266 9261 8560
Nominal PSE (US$ million) 5305 5397 1631 -614 -1855 1292 1735 4067 5224 5290 4304 3481 1888 -14968 4738 4313 4798 7085 8049
percent
%PSE 
  Trade Economist Denominator
     PSEc 28.8 25.3 6.5 -0.8 -4.8 4.9 6.9 16.4 21.4 24.0 18.2 14.8 7.2 -16.9 17.7 12.6 13.6 28.3 34.7
     PSE 42.7 41.6 9.8 -3.1 -8.4 6.5 8.8 21.2 28.4 28.4 19.3 15.3 8.2 -37.9 23.0 20.2 23.3 37.4 44.2
  OECD Denominator
     PSEc 20.2 17.9 5.9 -0.8 -5.3 4.6 6.4 13.5 16.7 18.7 15.3 12.8 6.7 -27.2 14.4 10.5 11.0 20.6 24.1
     PSE 29.9 29.4 8.9 -3.1 -9.2 6.1 8.1 17.5 22.1 22.1 16.2 13.3 7.5 -61.0 18.7 16.8 18.9 27.2 30.7
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note:    MPSC refers to PSE commodities only; MPS refers to total agriculture   57
7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
We have estimated indicators of support (NPRs and PSEs) for Indonesia’s 
agriculture based on the conventional OECD methodology, and using variants based on 
alternative adjustments and assumptions (Mullen et al., 2004).  The quantitative results 
have been analyzed in the context of Indonesia’s economic structure and its international 
trade and agriculture policies from 1985 to 2003.  
Indonesia’s economy, during President Suharto’s regime (1968-1998), grew at an 
impressive rate. The progress in economic development was attributed to stable 
macroeconomic policies coupled with considerable investments in human resources 
(especially public health and education) and rural development.  Agriculture, benefiting 
from green revolution technologies and injections of resources from the management of 
oil export revenues, has been important in the Indonesian economy, especially as an 
income generator for the poor.  Growth in agriculture has been rapid but uneven, 
resulting from agricultural and trade policies dominated by the government’s goals to 
achieve self-sufficiency in various food commodities and to provide its light 
manufacturing sector with adequate and affordable supplies of primary agricultural 
inputs.  
The Asian financial crisis (1997/1998) interrupted Indonesia’s growth path, 
although the economy has since recovered, albeit at a lower rate than prior to the crisis. 
The GOI’s policy objectives for agriculture are still responding to old concerns of 
achieving self-sufficiency, especially in rice and sugar, but they now compete with new 
concerns including poverty alleviations, decentralization and diversification of the 
agricultural sector toward higher value crops, and increasing exports of value-added 
processed agricultural products.   
The GOI intervenes in production, marketing and trade of agricultural products 
employing a set of complicated agricultural price, procurement, distribution, storage, and 
input subsidy policies. The government has also utilized many trade policy instruments,   58
such as import tariffs, quantitative restrictions, import and export licensing, and 
interregional marketing restrictions. The state-owned enterprise, BULOG, in spite of its 
diminished role, continues to be instrumental in implementing these policies of the major 
food crops, especially rice.  
The reform process, which started in the mid-1980s, has been unilateral, as well 
as in response to commitments under the WTO and the agreement with the IMF 
following the financial crisis. The major agricultural reforms have been the tariffication 
of quantitative trade restrictions for agricultural products, the elimination of input 
subsidies, and the removal of BULOG’s monopoly on import and distribution. The 
reform process has been marked with occasional policy reversals and setbacks and some 
of the policies remain obscured.  
The support measures computed in this study are an attempt in quantifying the net 
effects of these policies. The NPR and PSEs computed for Indonesia show that in spite of 
the reforms, the GOI has subsidized its agriculture over the past twenty years, although 
not uniformly across commodities. The pattern of protection has been much more 
consistent since the 1990s, interrupted only by the 1997/1998 financial crisis. Following 
the crisis, subsidies reverted to their pre-crisis level and even increased for some 
commodities.  On average, the %PSE for the country more than doubled between 1986-
1988 (11.7 percent) and 2001-2003 (26 percent). 
The results presented in this study must be interpreted with the usual caution 
associated with the estimation of support indicators in general and the PSEs in particular 
due to the assumptions and judgments made when computing their various components. 
In the study, the choice of transportations costs and marketing margins may have 
underestimated or overestimated the value of these activities, inflating or deflating the 
value of support accruing to producers. The choice of markets to compare international 
and domestic prices, in spite of the attention given to the differences in processing and 
accounting for marketing costs, may raise the issue of whom is actually benefiting from 
the support, the farmer, the miller, or the trader. The process of  “scaling-up” the PSE   59
values to all of agriculture without examining the policies affecting the non-covered 
commodities, underlines the necessity for a more comprehensive study, which would 
include other agricultural sectors, for example the livestock sector.  
Nevertheless, a reasonable assessment of support for agriculture in Indonesia over 
the period 1985-2003 emerges from the analysis presented. Observers of Indonesia have 
noted the slow down in productivity starting in the mid 1990s in agriculture in general 
and in food and non food crops in particular (Fuglie, 2003: Table 1). For commodities 
like rice and sugar, for which our results show increased protection in the past five years, 
productivity and farmer income prospect have not been very good.
23 It is beyond the 
scope of this study to assess the effects of agriculture protection in Indonesia on 
agricultural growth and productivity but the mixed evidence of productivity slow down 
with increased level of support suggests that protection has not contributed to growth in a 
positive way.  
                                                 




Figure A.1—Comparing NPRs of imported commodities from various authors 
a.  Rice        b.  Maize 
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Table A.1—Indonesia’s commodity PSEs (1985-2003) 
 
a.   Rice 
Rice 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
MPS 2800 3054 260 -1327 -2169 1053 822 2647 4002 5370 4782 3549 4137 -52112 15140 17836 18278 40683 41280
Budgetary Payments 828 665 489 787 500 537 713 862 868 950 1715 1490 1702 2166 4694 2346 1450 1038 921
Nominal PSE 3628 3719 749 -540 -1670 1590 1535 3509 4871 6320 6497 5038 5839 -49946 19834 20182 19729 41721 42201
percent
%PSE
   Trade Economist Denominator 55.0 52.9 6.6 -3.3 -8.7 8.9 7.6 17.8 26.1 29.9 22.2 15.4 16.6 -41.9 25.0 29.2 27.3 55.8 59.2
   OECD Denominator 35.5 34.6 6.2 -3.4 -9.5 8.1 7.1 15.1 20.7 23.0 18.1 13.4 14.2 -72.1 20.0 22.6 21.4 35.8 37.2





b.   Maize 
 
Maize 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
MPS -46 177 222 -38 -45 62 223 157 278 515 599 -106 498 -5095 965 1129 1825 1326 2110
Budgetary Payments 18 17 11 22 10 12 14 19 14 16 37 30 34 52 109 45 26 18 31
Nominal PSE -28 194 233 -16 -35 74 237 176 292 531 636 -76 532 -5044 1074 1174 1851 1344 2141
percent
%PSE
   Trade Economist Denominator -4.0 22.3 28.0 -1.0 -2.2 4.1 13.7 7.9 16.2 25.5 21.4 -1.6 13.4 -37.9 12.7 12.4 16.6 11.6 16.8
   OECD Denominator -4.2 18.3 21.8 -1.0 -2.2 4.0 12.0 7.3 14.0 20.3 17.6 -1.6 11.8 -60.9 11.3 11.0 14.3 10.4 14.4
Difference 0.2 4.1 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.6 0.6 2.3 5.2 3.8 0.0 1.6 23.1 1.4 1.4 2.4 1.2 2.4  62
Table A.1  Continued 
 




d.  Sugar 
 
 
Soybeans 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
MPS 157 263 421 392 315 640 747 866 917 872 986 879 710 -356 1646 980 876 228 102
B u d g e t a r y  P a y m e n t s 43 342335447557 1 65212
Nominal PSE 161 266 424 396 317 643 750 871 920 876 993 884 716 -350 1662 984 878 229 104
percent
%PSE
   Trade Economist Denominator 87.6 118.7 95.9 58.2 39.0 80.6 84.6 80.4 89.7 80.9 84.4 70.0 50.6 -9.0 63.1 50.4 46.7 15.9 6.4
   OECD Denominator 46.7 54.3 48.9 36.8 28.1 44.6 45.8 44.6 47.3 44.7 45.8 41.2 33.6 -9.8 38.7 33.5 31.8 13.8 6.0
Difference 40.9 64.5 46.9 21.4 10.9 36.0 38.8 35.9 42.4 36.2 38.6 28.8 17.0 0.9 24.4 16.9 14.8 2.2 0.4
Sugar 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
MPS n.a. n.a. 106 -314 -647 -581 -97 961 913 463 789 1017 -487 392 2894 337 908 1719 3972
Budgetary Payments n.a. n.a. 57 91 45 51 62 77 72 79 129 95 107 142 279 112 71 49 74
Nominal PSE n.a. n.a. 163 -223 -602 -530 -35 1038 985 542 918 1112 -380 534 3173 448 978 1768 4046
percent
%PSE
   Trade Economist Denominator n.a. n.a. 19.9 -17.0 -33.8 -28.4 -2.5 69.6 54.7 24.7 42.9 54.2 -14.1 15.0 73.2 9.4 14.9 36.8 101.3
   OECD Denominator n.a. n.a. 16.6 -20.4 -51.0 -39.7 -2.5 41.0 35.3 19.8 30.0 35.1 -16.4 13.0 42.3 8.6 13.0 26.9 50.3
Difference n.a. n.a. 3.3 3.5 17.2 11.3 0.1 28.5 19.3 4.9 12.9 19.0 2.3 2.0 30.9 0.8 1.9 9.9 51.0  63
Table A.1  Continued 
 





f.  Natural Rubber 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Natural Rubber 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
MPS -44 -180 99 -66 1 -50 -74 -72 6 306 229 59 -2025 2089 1246 -975 557 821 n.a.
B u d g e t a r y  P a y m e n t s 43 242233347568 1 98535
Nominal PSE -40 -177 102 -62 3 -48 -71 -69 9 309 236 64 -2019 2097 1265 -967 561 824 n.a.
percent
%PSE
   Trade Economist Denominator -4.9 -17.4 6.5 -2.9 0.2 -2.6 -3.6 -3.0 0.4 10.0 4.8 1.4 -43.2 21.1 18.5 -11.4 6.6 8.2 n.a.
   OECD Denominator -5.2 -21.1 6.1 -3.0 0.2 -2.7 -3.7 -3.1 0.4 9.1 4.6 1.3 -76.1 17.4 15.6 -12.9 6.1 7.6 n.a.
Difference 0.3 3.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.0 32.9 3.7 2.9 1.5 0.4 0.6 n.a.
Crude Palm Oil (CPO) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rp billion
MPS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 166 755 1030 884 -538 603 -59 -13673 485 663 4561 3478 5309
Budgetary Payments n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 27 32 37 48 99 79 104 150 389 170 107 84 133
Nominal PSE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 193 787 1067 932 -438 682 45 -13524 874 833 4668 3562 5442
percent
%PSE
   Trade Economist Denominator n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.7 36.3 45.1 26.2 -7.7 12.4 0.6 -48.0 5.8 6.2 23.4 12.3 17.0
   OECD Denominator n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.3 26.7 31.1 20.8 -8.4 11.0 0.6 -92.2 5.5 5.9 18.9 11.0 14.5
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